/* vi: set sw=4 ts=4: */ /* * Licensed under GPLv2 or later, see file LICENSE in this tarball for details. */ #include "libbb.h" #include #include #include #if ENABLE_SELINUX #include /* for is_selinux_enabled() */ #include /* for get_default_context() */ #include /* for security class definitions */ #endif #if ENABLE_PAM /* PAM may include . We may need to undefine bbox's stub define: */ #undef setlocale /* For some obscure reason, PAM is not in pam/xxx, but in security/xxx. * Apparently they like to confuse people. */ #include #include static const struct pam_conv conv = { misc_conv, NULL }; #endif enum { TIMEOUT = 60, EMPTY_USERNAME_COUNT = 10, USERNAME_SIZE = 32, TTYNAME_SIZE = 32, }; static char* short_tty; #if ENABLE_FEATURE_UTMP /* vv Taken from tinylogin utmp.c vv */ /* * read_or_build_utent - see if utmp file is correct for this process * * System V is very picky about the contents of the utmp file * and requires that a slot for the current process exist. * The utmp file is scanned for an entry with the same process * ID. If no entry exists the process exits with a message. * * The "picky" flag is for network and other logins that may * use special flags. It allows the pid checks to be overridden. * This means that getty should never invoke login with any * command line flags. */ static void read_or_build_utent(struct utmp *utptr, int picky) { struct utmp *ut; pid_t pid = getpid(); setutent(); /* First, try to find a valid utmp entry for this process. */ while ((ut = getutent())) if (ut->ut_pid == pid && ut->ut_line[0] && ut->ut_id[0] && (ut->ut_type == LOGIN_PROCESS || ut->ut_type == USER_PROCESS)) break; /* If there is one, just use it, otherwise create a new one. */ if (ut) { *utptr = *ut; } else { if (picky) bb_error_msg_and_die("no utmp entry found"); memset(utptr, 0, sizeof(*utptr)); utptr->ut_type = LOGIN_PROCESS; utptr->ut_pid = pid; strncpy(utptr->ut_line, short_tty, sizeof(utptr->ut_line)); /* This one is only 4 chars wide. Try to fit something * remotely meaningful by skipping "tty"... */ strncpy(utptr->ut_id, short_tty + 3, sizeof(utptr->ut_id)); strncpy(utptr->ut_user, "LOGIN", sizeof(utptr->ut_user)); utptr->ut_time = time(NULL); } if (!picky) /* root login */ memset(utptr->ut_host, 0, sizeof(utptr->ut_host)); } /* * write_utent - put a USER_PROCESS entry in the utmp file * * write_utent changes the type of the current utmp entry to * USER_PROCESS. the wtmp file will be updated as well. */ static void write_utent(struct utmp *utptr, const char *username) { utptr->ut_type = USER_PROCESS; strncpy(utptr->ut_user, username, sizeof(utptr->ut_user)); utptr->ut_time = time(NULL); /* other fields already filled in by read_or_build_utent above */ setutent(); pututline(utptr); endutent(); #if ENABLE_FEATURE_WTMP if (access(bb_path_wtmp_file, R_OK|W_OK) == -1) { close(creat(bb_path_wtmp_file, 0664)); } updwtmp(bb_path_wtmp_file, utptr); #endif } #else /* !ENABLE_FEATURE_UTMP */ #define read_or_build_utent(utptr, picky) ((void)0) #define write_utent(utptr, username) ((void)0) #endif /* !ENABLE_FEATURE_UTMP */ #if ENABLE_FEATURE_NOLOGIN static void die_if_nologin_and_non_root(int amroot) { FILE *fp; int c; if (access("/etc/nologin", F_OK)) return; fp = fopen("/etc/nologin", "r"); if (fp) { while ((c = getc(fp)) != EOF) putchar((c=='\n') ? '\r' : c); fflush(stdout); fclose(fp); } else puts("\r\nSystem closed for routine maintenance\r"); if (!amroot) exit(1); puts("\r\n[Disconnect bypassed -- root login allowed]\r"); } #else static ALWAYS_INLINE void die_if_nologin_and_non_root(int amroot) {} #endif #if ENABLE_FEATURE_SECURETTY && !ENABLE_PAM static int check_securetty(void) { FILE *fp; int i; char buf[256]; fp = fopen("/etc/securetty", "r"); if (!fp) { /* A missing securetty file is not an error. */ return 1; } while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf)-1, fp)) { for (i = strlen(buf)-1; i >= 0; --i) { if (!isspace(buf[i])) break; } buf[++i] = '\0'; if (!buf[0] || (buf[0] == '#')) continue; if (strcmp(buf, short_tty) == 0) { fclose(fp); return 1; } } fclose(fp); return 0; } #else static ALWAYS_INLINE int check_securetty(void) { return 1; } #endif static void get_username_or_die(char *buf, int size_buf) { int c, cntdown; cntdown = EMPTY_USERNAME_COUNT; prompt: print_login_prompt(); /* skip whitespace */ do { c = getchar(); if (c == EOF) exit(1); if (c == '\n') { if (!--cntdown) exit(1); goto prompt; } } while (isspace(c)); *buf++ = c; if (!fgets(buf, size_buf-2, stdin)) exit(1); if (!strchr(buf, '\n')) exit(1); while (isgraph(*buf)) buf++; *buf = '\0'; } static void motd(void) { int fd; fd = open(bb_path_motd_file, O_RDONLY); if (fd) { fflush(stdout); bb_copyfd_eof(fd, STDOUT_FILENO); close(fd); } } static void alarm_handler(int sig ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED) { /* This is the escape hatch! Poor serial line users and the like * arrive here when their connection is broken. * We don't want to block here */ ndelay_on(1); ndelay_on(2); printf("\r\nLogin timed out after %d seconds\r\n", TIMEOUT); exit(EXIT_SUCCESS); } int login_main(int argc, char **argv); int login_main(int argc, char **argv) { enum { LOGIN_OPT_f = (1<<0), LOGIN_OPT_h = (1<<1), LOGIN_OPT_p = (1<<2), }; char *fromhost; char username[USERNAME_SIZE]; const char *tmp; int amroot; unsigned opt; int count = 0; struct passwd *pw; char *opt_host = NULL; char *opt_user = NULL; char full_tty[TTYNAME_SIZE]; USE_SELINUX(security_context_t user_sid = NULL;) USE_FEATURE_UTMP(struct utmp utent;) USE_PAM(pam_handle_t *pamh;) USE_PAM(int pamret;) USE_PAM(const char *failed_msg;) short_tty = full_tty; username[0] = '\0'; amroot = (getuid() == 0); signal(SIGALRM, alarm_handler); alarm(TIMEOUT); /* Mandatory paranoia for suid applet: * ensure that fd# 0,1,2 are opened (at least to /dev/null) * and any extra open fd's are closed. * (The name of the function is misleading. Not daemonizing here.) */ bb_daemonize_or_rexec(DAEMON_ONLY_SANITIZE | DAEMON_CLOSE_EXTRA_FDS, NULL); opt = getopt32(argv, "f:h:p", &opt_user, &opt_host); if (opt & LOGIN_OPT_f) { if (!amroot) bb_error_msg_and_die("-f is for root only"); safe_strncpy(username, opt_user, sizeof(username)); } if (optind < argc) /* user from command line (getty) */ safe_strncpy(username, argv[optind], sizeof(username)); /* Let's find out and memorize our tty */ if (!isatty(0) || !isatty(1) || !isatty(2)) return EXIT_FAILURE; /* Must be a terminal */ safe_strncpy(full_tty, "UNKNOWN", sizeof(full_tty)); tmp = ttyname(0); if (tmp) { safe_strncpy(full_tty, tmp, sizeof(full_tty)); if (strncmp(full_tty, "/dev/", 5) == 0) short_tty = full_tty + 5; } read_or_build_utent(&utent, !amroot); if (opt_host) { USE_FEATURE_UTMP( safe_strncpy(utent.ut_host, opt_host, sizeof(utent.ut_host)); ) fromhost = xasprintf(" on '%s' from '%s'", short_tty, opt_host); } else fromhost = xasprintf(" on '%s'", short_tty); /* Was breaking "login " from shell command line: */ /*bb_setpgrp();*/ openlog(applet_name, LOG_PID | LOG_CONS | LOG_NOWAIT, LOG_AUTH); while (1) { if (!username[0]) get_username_or_die(username, sizeof(username)); #if ENABLE_PAM pamret = pam_start("login", username, &conv, &pamh); if (pamret != PAM_SUCCESS) { failed_msg = "pam_start"; goto pam_auth_failed; } /* set TTY (so things like securetty work) */ pamret = pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_TTY, short_tty); if (pamret != PAM_SUCCESS) { failed_msg = "pam_set_item(TTY)"; goto pam_auth_failed; } pamret = pam_authenticate(pamh, 0); if (pamret != PAM_SUCCESS) { failed_msg = "pam_authenticate"; goto pam_auth_failed; /* TODO: or just "goto auth_failed" * since user seems to enter wrong password * (in this case pamret == 7) */ } /* check that the account is healthy */ pamret = pam_acct_mgmt(pamh, 0); if (pamret != PAM_SUCCESS) { failed_msg = "account setup"; goto pam_auth_failed; } /* read user back */ { const char *pamuser; /* gcc: "dereferencing type-punned pointer breaks aliasing rules..." * thus we cast to (void*) */ if (pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_USER, (void*)&pamuser) != PAM_SUCCESS) { failed_msg = "pam_get_item(USER)"; goto pam_auth_failed; } safe_strncpy(username, pamuser, sizeof(username)); } /* If we get here, the user was authenticated, and is * granted access. */ pw = getpwnam(username); if (pw) break; goto auth_failed; pam_auth_failed: bb_error_msg("%s failed: %s (%d)", failed_msg, pam_strerror(pamh, pamret), pamret); safe_strncpy(username, "UNKNOWN", sizeof(username)); #else /* not PAM */ pw = getpwnam(username); if (!pw) { strcpy(username, "UNKNOWN"); goto fake_it; } if (pw->pw_passwd[0] == '!' || pw->pw_passwd[0] == '*') goto auth_failed; if (opt & LOGIN_OPT_f) break; /* -f USER: success without asking passwd */ if (pw->pw_uid == 0 && !check_securetty()) goto auth_failed; /* Don't check the password if password entry is empty (!) */ if (!pw->pw_passwd[0]) break; fake_it: /* authorization takes place here */ if (correct_password(pw)) break; #endif /* ENABLE_PAM */ auth_failed: opt &= ~LOGIN_OPT_f; bb_do_delay(FAIL_DELAY); /* TODO: doesn't sound like correct English phrase to me */ puts("Login incorrect"); if (++count == 3) { syslog(LOG_WARNING, "invalid password for '%s'%s", username, fromhost); return EXIT_FAILURE; } username[0] = '\0'; } alarm(0); die_if_nologin_and_non_root(pw->pw_uid == 0); write_utent(&utent, username); #if ENABLE_SELINUX if (is_selinux_enabled()) { security_context_t old_tty_sid, new_tty_sid; if (get_default_context(username, NULL, &user_sid)) { bb_error_msg_and_die("cannot get SID for %s", username); } if (getfilecon(full_tty, &old_tty_sid) < 0) { bb_perror_msg_and_die("getfilecon(%s) failed", full_tty); } if (security_compute_relabel(user_sid, old_tty_sid, SECCLASS_CHR_FILE, &new_tty_sid) != 0) { bb_perror_msg_and_die("security_change_sid(%s) failed", full_tty); } if (setfilecon(full_tty, new_tty_sid) != 0) { bb_perror_msg_and_die("chsid(%s, %s) failed", full_tty, new_tty_sid); } } #endif /* Try these, but don't complain if they fail. * _f_chown is safe wrt race t=ttyname(0);...;chown(t); */ fchown(0, pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_gid); fchmod(0, 0600); if (ENABLE_LOGIN_SCRIPTS) { char *t_argv[2]; t_argv[0] = getenv("LOGIN_PRE_SUID_SCRIPT"); if (t_argv[0]) { t_argv[1] = NULL; xsetenv("LOGIN_TTY", full_tty); xsetenv("LOGIN_USER", pw->pw_name); xsetenv("LOGIN_UID", utoa(pw->pw_uid)); xsetenv("LOGIN_GID", utoa(pw->pw_gid)); xsetenv("LOGIN_SHELL", pw->pw_shell); xspawn(t_argv); /* NOMMU-friendly */ /* All variables are unset by setup_environment */ wait(NULL); } } change_identity(pw); tmp = pw->pw_shell; if (!tmp || !*tmp) tmp = DEFAULT_SHELL; /* setup_environment params: shell, loginshell, changeenv, pw */ setup_environment(tmp, 1, !(opt & LOGIN_OPT_p), pw); /* FIXME: login shell = 1 -> 3rd parameter is ignored! */ motd(); if (pw->pw_uid == 0) syslog(LOG_INFO, "root login%s", fromhost); #if ENABLE_SELINUX /* well, a simple setexeccon() here would do the job as well, * but let's play the game for now */ set_current_security_context(user_sid); #endif // util-linux login also does: // /* start new session */ // setsid(); // /* TIOCSCTTY: steal tty from other process group */ // if (ioctl(0, TIOCSCTTY, 1)) error_msg... // BBox login used to do this (see above): // bb_setpgrp(); // If this stuff is really needed, add it and explain why! /* set signals to defaults */ signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL); /* Is this correct? This way user can ctrl-c out of /etc/profile, * potentially creating security breach (tested with bash 3.0). * But without this, bash 3.0 will not enable ctrl-c either. * Maybe bash is buggy? * Need to find out what standards say about /bin/login - * should it leave SIGINT etc enabled or disabled? */ signal(SIGINT, SIG_DFL); /* Exec login shell with no additional parameters */ run_shell(tmp, 1, NULL, NULL); /* return EXIT_FAILURE; - not reached */ }